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Decedents' Estates, Trusts and Future

Interest-1964 Tennessee Survey
Herman L. Trautman*
I.

DECEDENTS" ESTATES

A. Wills
1. Validity of Instrument Which Only Appoints Fiduciary
2. Widow's Dissent vs. Intestate Share
3. Issues and Burden of Proof on Contest of Two Wills
B. Administrationand Settlement Problems
1. Simultaneous Deaths-Husband'sEstate Liable for Funeral Expenses of Wife
2. Claims for UnliquidatedDamages-No Exception Required
II. FEDERAL TAXATON OF TENNESSEE WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
A. Tennessee Support Allowance and The MaritalDeduction
B. Beneficiary's Power to Invade CorpusIs a Power of Appointment
As indicated above, the subject matter for discussion will include
for the first time a separate heading for federal tax cases involving
Tennessee probate law. It is contemplated that this practice will be
followed in future years. The state developments will include only
relevant court decisions as the General Assembly was not in session
during the 1964 calendar year.
I. DECEDENT'S ESTATES

A. Wills
1. Validity of Instrument Which Only Appoints Fiduciary.-Is an
instrument which makes no testamentary gift, but only designates or
appoints the personal representative to administer the estate and
provides certain special powers of fiduciary administration entitled
to probate as a valid will? While it has been said that there need be
no dispositive gift of property to entitle a testamentary writing to
probate as a will,' there seems to have been no definite court decision
in Tennessee so holding until the recent case of Delaney v. First
Peoples Bank of Johnson City.2 In that case a writing properly
executed with the formalities required for making wills was offered
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Nashville and Tennessee Bars.
1. 1 PmTcs Im, W.s AND EsTATEs § 3 (3d ed. 1955).
2. 380 S.W.2d 65 (Tenn. 1964).
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for probate and contested by the decedents sole heir at law and next
of kin. From the writing it appears that the decedent was primarily
interested in naming an experienced and dependable personal representative to take charge of his assets, pay claims, expenses and taxes,
file all proper tax returns, and distribute the estate according to the
laws of intestate succession. Unlike the statutory law of administration, however, the writing authorized "the administrator" to sell at
public or private sale, at such prices and terms as he may deem
reasonable, such items of personal or real property as the administrator
in his discretion may select "and its exercise of such discretion in this
determination is absolute and may not be reviewed." In a society
in which tax administration has come to require perhaps more than
fifty percent of probate administration, here was a decedent whose
sole concern seems to have been to have his gross estate administered
as an economic unit by a capable fiduciary. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that the writing was entitled to probate as a valid will,
and rejected the petition of the sole heir at law and next of kin to
be appointed administratrix of the estate. The decision seems to
be in accord with the authorities in other states Thus, the law
accords to a decedent the right to name the one who shall administer
his estate, and to define his fiduciary powers, even though he makes
no dispositive gifts and allows the statutes of intestate succession to
control the devolution of his property.
2. Widow's Dissent v. Intestate Share.-Suppose a widow dissents
from her husband's will which bequeathed his entire estate, consisting
only of personal property, in trust to pay her the income for her
life, with remainder over under a power of appointment, and suppose
further that there are no children or descendants surviving. After filing
the dissent, is the widow a proper party in interest to contest the
validity of the remainder gift? If so, and if she is successful, is she
entitled to the entire estate under Tennessee Code Annotated section
31-201 (2), as if the husband had died intestate? What precisely is
the relationship of Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-606, providing that upon dissent a widow shall be entitled to not more than
one-third of the decedents personal estate, to section 31-201 (2),
providing that where any person dies intestate leaving a surviving
spouse but no descendants, the surviving spouse shall receive the
entire net personal estate? The answers to these questions do not
appear to be clear under the reported Tennessee decisions, and,
unfortunately, the recent decision of Allen v. First American National
Bank4 rendered by the Middle Section of the Court of Appeals seems
3. Ibid. See cases and treatises liberally cited in the opinion.

4. 376 S.W.2d 713 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1963).
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to make the answers even more equivocal. If this comment is justified
by the discussion below, there would seem to be need for either a
definitive decision by the Supreme Court of Tennessee or for legislation so that widow's elections can be made intelligently, and needless litigation avoided.
In the Allen case the holographic will gave the widow a life income
interest in a trust of personal property. It provided that at her death
the trust would terminate "and is to be disbursed according to instructions of".. . A, B and C. The widow filed a dissent in the county
court. In it she stated that she expressly reserved the right to question
the validity of the remainder gift in the will. She later filed the
instant suit in the chancery court to construe the will, asserting the
invalidity of the remainder gift and that she was entitled to receive
the remainder as intestate property. The defendants-the executor and
A, B and C-answered that having dissented from the will and received
(1) exempt property, (2) jointly owned property, (3) a year's support allowance of 9,600 dollars, and (4) being entitled to receive a
one-third share of the net estate, the widow had no further interest in
the estate. The chancellor held that by her voluntary election to
dissent from the will the widow chose to receive the one-third interest
in the net personal estate provided in Tennessee Code Annotated
section 31-606, in addition to the exempt property and support allowance, and that she had no further interest in the assets of the estate,
regardless of what might be a proper construction of the remainder
gift. Accordingly, he refused to construe the remainder gift and,
instead, dismissed the widow's bill.
Error was assigned because of (1) the decision that the widow's
dissent deprived her of the right to question the validity of the
remainder gift, and (2) the refusal to pass upon the validity of that
gift. The Middle Section of the Court of Appeals first held that the
widow's election to dissent from the will did not deprive her of the
right to question the validity of the remainder gift, and further, a
dictum of apparently new law, that if her position were sustained,
"then she would become entitled to the entire residue under section
31-201."5 Thus, the court states that her right to dissent under Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-606 is not exclusive of her rights
under 31-201, but rather her rights under these statutes are concurrent. This would seem to be dictum, however, as the court went
ahead to do exactly what the chancery court refused to do,-it construed the remainder and held it to be a valid gift of a general power
of appointment to A, B, and C, which they could exercise by appointing to themselves. Thus, the widow seems to have gained nothing by
5. Id. at 718.
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the court of appeals decision. But suppose she had been successful
in having the remainder gift declared invalid? The court's opinion
would seem to make meaningless Tennessee Code Annotated section
31-606.
Turner v. Fisher6 and Watkins v. Dean7 are early nineteenth

century cases in Tennessee which certainly make it clear that, under
the act of 1784, a widow who dissents from her husband's will is not
entitled to the share of her husband's personalty which would have
gone to her if he died intestate. The court in the instant case agrees
that Tennessee Code Annotated 31-606 "is a substantial re-enactment"
of the 1784 statute. Nevertheless, the court seems to rely on a headnote appended to Miller v. Miller,8 that "the dissent of the widow to
the will and having had a year's support assigned her, will not estop
her from contesting the will."9 A reading of that case, however, makes
clear that the court refused to "positively adjudicate what may be
her rights ... if the will shall be set aside." 10 Instead, the court held
only "that she is not estopped by her dissent from making the contest " in this case because "this question is sought to be raised in
a collateral way. .. ,"12 Indeed, the court there agreed that "Undoubtedly upon strict principle... we should be bound to hold, that
the dissent of the widow from the will of her husband, cut her off
from all interest under the will, and that her interest was fixed by
this dissent....,,13

It may well be that the widow's election to dissent, which must be
made within nine months after the probate of the will, is indeed a
difficult decision to make, especially when there is a reasonable basis
for believing that the testamentary plan ultimately may be invalidated; in this event she would receive all of the net personal estate
under section 31-201 (2), rather than the one-third limited by section
31-606. If it is regarded as too difficult, or too much of a gamble,
perhaps the legislature might be persuaded to repeal section 31-606
and amend 31-605 to provide that upon dissent a surviving spouse
should receive the same share as if the decedent spouse had died
intestate. Apparently, this was the law from the time of the Code of
1858 to the amendments made by the acts of 1859-1860.14 It is indeed
6. 36 Tenn. 209 (1856).
7. 18 Tenn. 321 (1837).
8. 52 Tenn. 723 (1870).
9. Id. at 724, head-note 4.
10. Id. at 732.
11. Ibid.
12. Id. at 730.
13. Id. at 729.
14. 376 S.W.2d at 717. See the interesting comment of Hoffman, Dissenting
Widow's Rights In Personalty, Where There Are No Children, 19 TENN. L. Rlv. 941
(1942).
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difficult, however, to determine what the law of Tennessee is today
with respect to this important election. While the court in Allen
seems to say that the widow has both the right to dissent from the
will and the right to have it set aside and take by intestate succession,
the authority cited is not persuasive, and the plain meaning, purpose,
and legislative history of Tennessee Code Annotated section 31-606
seem to require an opposite result.
3. Issues and Burden of Proof on Contest of Two Wills.-When the
validity of a will is contested, the statute provides that the county
court shall make a certificate of that fact and send it to the circuit
court together with the original will 5 for trial on the issue devisavit
vel non. It is further provided that the specific issues for trial shall
be "made up, under direction" of the circuit court.16 It is said that
while the general burden of proof on the issue devisavit vel non is
on the proponent of the will, when the will is contested upon the
ground of want of mental capacity, not only is the burden on the
contestor, but in addition there is a presumption against him.17
Usually, the proponent has the right to open and close the case. 18
In Williams v. Bridgeford,19 two wills were filed for probate within
a fortnight after decedent's death and the interested parties under each
will contested the other. Both were certified to the circuit court
where the issues for trial were made up on the basis of a trial of the
validity of the later will, it being assumed that "if the will of March 31,
1961 had been invalidated by the verdict of the jury, the will of
February 13, 1953 would have been established.... ."2 Accordingly,
there was no error in allowing the proponent of the later will to open
and close. McBee v. Bowman,2 1 where the proponent of the earlier
will was allowed to open and close, was distinguished on the
ground that there the issues submitted for trial turned wholly upon
the validity of the earlier will. While the statute puts procedural
problems within the control and discretion of the trial judge, it appears
that the proponent of the will usually receives the right to open and
close the case notwithstanding that the risk of non-persuasion is on the
contestor on the issue of lack of capacity.
15. TmN. CODE ANN.§ 32-401 (1956).
16. TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-405 (1956). See 1 PtwcHAnD, op. cit. supra note 1,

§§ 364-68.

17. Puryear v. Reese, 46 Tenn. 21 (1867); Williams v. Bridgeford, 383 S.W.2d 770
(Tenn. App. W.S. 1964). See Morgan, Burden of Proof and Presumptions In Will

Contests In Tennessee, 5 VAND. L. REv. 74 (1951).
18. Ibid.
19. 383 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. App. W. S. 1964).

20. Id. at 775.
21. 89 Tenn. 132, 14 S.W. 481 (1890).
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B. Administrationand Settlement Problems
1. Simultaneous Deaths-Husband's Estate Liable For Funeral
Expenses of Wife.-While ordinarily the husband's duty to support
his wife ends with his death, and under the Simultaneous Death Act 22
there is no presumption that one survived the other, In re Deskins'
Estates,2 held that the husband's estate was liable for the wife's
funeral expenses even though her estate was solvent. Although the
court did not believe the Simultaneous Death Act to be relevant
because this issue arose as a claim filed by the personal representative
of the wife against the husband's estate, whereas that statute deals
with the devolution of property on the deaths of two or more persons
in a common disaster where there is no evidence as to who survived,
the authorities and principles discussed by the court involve the
liability of a surviving husband where the deceased wife's estate is
solvent. In the instant case the husband and wife were killed in an
airplane crash where there was no evidence of who survived.
2. Claims For Unliquidated Damages-No Exception Required.It is said on good authority24 that the necessity for separate law suits
against the personal representative to enforce contractural obligations of the decedent was eliminated in Tennessee in most situations
by the enactment in 1939 of the statute which now comprises Tennessee Code Annotated sections 30-509 through 30-518. Under this
act claims must be filed with the clerk of the court in which the
estate is being administered within nine months from the date of
notice to creditors, 25 and are disposed of on exceptions26 either in the
circuit court before a jury27 or before the judge of the probate court
without a jury. 28 The filing of a claim under the provisions of this
statute is equivalent to the commencement of an action. The sweeping language of section 30-510 is broad enough to cover all types of
claims against the estate. While it has been held that the section does
not apply to tax claims29 and tort claims, 30 it is clear that it applies to
all claims arising from contracts and agreements.3 ' Until the recent
case of Coin Automatic Company, Inc. v Dixon,32 there has been no
§§ 31-502 to -508 (1956).
23. 381 S.W.2d 921 (Tenn. 1964).
24. 2 PmTcsrAR, op. cit. supra note 1, § 717.
25. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-510 (1956).
26. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-517 (1956).
27. Ibid.
28. TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-518; see 2 Pnrrcuu, op. cit. supra note 1, § 717.
29. Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 42 Tenn. App. 486, 304 S.W.2d 504 (1957).
30. Collins v. Ruffner, 185 Tenn. 290, 206 S.W.2d 298 (1947).
31. Ibid.; see also Eslick v. Friedman, 191 Tenn. 647, 235 S.W.2d 808 (1951);
Wilson v. Haffey, 189 Tenn. 598, 226 S.W.2d 308 (1950); Warfield v. Thomas'
Estate, 185 Tenn. 328, 206 S.W.2d 372 (1947).
32. 375 S.W.2d 858 (1964) (Clement, R., Spec. J).
22. TEN. CODE ANN.
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apparent indication that a distinction would be made in the application of the 1939 statute for unliquidated claims arising in contracts
and liquidated claims.3 In this case, however, the claim was for
damages in the total amount of 20,000 dollars against the estate because of an alleged breach of contract by the decedent of a promise
not to compete. The claim was filed within the nine months period
allowed by the statute, but the personal representative neglected to
file the exception provided in section 30-517 within the thirty days
after the expiration of the period for filing claims. The creditor
asserted that his claim had become a final judgment because of the
executor's failure to except, and, indeed, it has been so held in cases
involving claims based upon the theory of quantum meruit for the
reasonable value of services performed for a decedent.34 But the court
in Coin Automatic states that the 1939 statute contemplates "a
liquidated claim,"35 and therefore the claimant for unliquidated

damage had no right to have his claim adjudicated in this manner,
i.e., by the executor's neglect to except. The court states that to so
hold would be a dangerous precedent, and if this is new law, "we
believe it to be good law."36 It may be that Tennessee Code Annotated

section 30-517 should be amended to relieve the harsh effect of the
fiduciary's failure to file an exception to a claim against the estate.
It would seem reasonable to provide that any claim not paid within
thirty days after the expiration of the period for filing claims shall be
transferred to the issue docket of an appropriate court for trial after
due notice to the parties in interest.
II. FEDERAL TAXATION OF TENNEssEE WILLs,TRUSTS AND EsTATEs

A. Tennessee Support Allowance and the MaritalDeduction
The widow's support allowance authorized by Tennessee Code
Annotated sections 30-802 and 30-803 was held to qualify for the
federal estate tax marital deduction3 7 in Hamilton National Bank of

Knoxville v. United States.38 A second wife for whom no provision was

made in decedents will dissented and commissioners set apart for her
8,400 dollars as a support allowance. The court emphasized the
33. See cases cited note 31 supra. Brigham v. Southern Trust Co., 201 Tenn. 466,
300 S.W.2d 880 (1957); see also Needham v. Moore, 200 Tenn. 445, 292 S.W.2d
720 (1956).
34. Brigham v. Southern Trust Co., supra note 33; Needham v. Moore, supra note
33; Warfield v. Thomas' Estate, 185 Tenn. 328, 206 S.W.2d 372 (1947).

35. 375 S.W.2d at 861.
36. Id. at 862.

37. INT.REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
38. 229 F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Tenn. 1964)

Robert L. Taylor).

(well written opinion by Chief Judge
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statutory language providing that the money "so set apart shall be the
absolute property of the widow for said uses." 39 Unfortunately, twenty
days after the date of this decision the Supreme Court of the United
States decided Jackson v. United States4" which held specifically that
a widow's support allowance awarded by a California probate court
does not qualify for the marital deduction, even to the extent actually
paid to her, and is not refundable. The result is that the basic premise
upon which was based the decision of the United States District Court
for Eastern Tennessee, and the several other court decisions there
cited, was substantially rejected. It is not inaccurate to say that the
position taken by the Supreme Court in the Jackson case will defeat
the estate tax marital deduction for the widow's support allowance in
the large majority of American states. The Court adopted the
government's argument that the widow's support allowance is a
non-qualified terminable interest because it must be ascertainable as of
the instant of the husband's death; it was said that her death or
remarriage prior to the award of the probate court would defeat her
right to it. The emphasis on date of death rather than the date of
payment as the time when the right to a support allowance must
become indefeasible is not expressed in the Internal Revenue Code.
There is, however, a report of the Senate Finance Committee, that in
considering terminability of an interest for purposes of a marital
deduction "the situation is viewed as at the date of the decedent's
death."41 Congress rejected an amendment which would have
exempted from the terminable interest rule a widow's allowance to
42
the extent of payments made within one year of the decedent's death.
Another attempt was made in 1959 when the House passed a bill
exempting support payments made within fifteen months after the
43
decedent's death, but the measure was not reported out of the Senate.
The American Bar Association has recommended an amendment
which would permit deduction of all allowance payments made to
widows within the three years within which tax assessments must
be made-a generous period indeed.
It may be that Congress will someday amend the Code to incorporate the time-of-payment standard rather than the possible contingencies-as-of-date-of-death test adopted by the Jackson case. By way of
analogy, one may compare the common law rule against perpetuities,
39. TENN.CODE ANN.§ 30-803 (1956) (Emphasis added.)
40. 376 U.S. 503 (1964).
41. S. REP. No. 1013, Part 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1948). See Note, The Widow's
Allowance and the Marital Deduction, 77 HAzy. L. REV. 533 (1964).
42. H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 318-19 (1954).
43. Note, supra note 41, at 542.

44. H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 10591, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). See ABA, SECTION OF
TAxATxoN PtocA, &ND Coi*n'mm-E REP. 55-57 (1959).
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under which a contingent future interest is invalidated on the basis
of a possibility rather than actuality, to the current "wait and see'
developments in that field. Prior to Jackson many lower Federal courts
sustained a tax deduction on the basis of the actuality, after waiting
and seeing, that the widow did not die or remarry before receiving
the award. On a policy basis it is difficult to say that the lower courts
so holding were wrong, because the widow's estate would be taxable
on the award if she had died immediately after receiving it. For the
present, however, the Tennessee widow's support allowance would
seem not to be entitled to the federal estate tax marital deduction
unless it can be established that her estate could recover the support
allowance from the husband's estate, if she were to die the day after
her husband's death.45
B. Beneficiary's Power To Invade Corpus Is a Power of Appointment
In Ewing v. Rountree,46 the testator bequeathed his estate in trust
to pay the income to his wife with remainder to others. He directed
the trustee, however, to sell annually upon the wife's request one
hundred shares of Humble Oil stock and pay the proceeds to her, and
"Should my wife at any time request sale of more stock" of the company mentioned, "she may to that extent invade the corpus . . .
having such sale made and the proceeds paid over to her." The
testator wrote the will in 1945 and died in 1947 when the power given
to the wife would not have been taxable in her estate at her death.
She died in 1958, however, and the 1951 Powers of Appointment Act,
which is now section 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code, changed the
tax law existing at the testator's death. The problem in the instant
case was whether the Humble Oil stock 7 should be included in the
gross estate of the wife. The executor's position was (1) that under
the law of Tennessee the wife's power to invade corpus was limited
by an "ascertainable standard," i.e., for health, support and maintenance, and thus, not a taxable power, and (2) that the government
is forbidden under the fifth amendment to apply the 1951 Powers of
Appointment Act retroactively to a power which was non-taxable
when created in 1947. The wife never exercised the power, and no
steps were taken after 1951 to disclaim or limit the extent of her power.
In deciding the questions raised in this case the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee reviewed the
45. Jackson v. United States, 376 U.S. 503 (1964).

46. 228 F. Supp. 137 (M.D. Tenn. 1964).
47. The Humble Oil stock was exchanged- for Standard Oil of New Jersey stock
in 1954 under a plan of reorganization. The stock involved in the instant case is really
Standard Oil stock.
48. A well written opinion by Chief Judge William E. Miller.
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power of appointment cases in Tennessee and came to the conclusion
that there is no Tennessee decision which requires a holding that a
trust beneficiary's power to invade corpus is limited by an ascertainable standard for health, support and maintenance. The court noted
Black v. Pettigrew,49 however, as a limitation to the extent that she
could not give the stock to others. This was not considered to be
a relevant limitation with respect to Federal taxation. The court said
that the Tennessee power of appointment cases fall into two categories: (1) Cases to determine whether under the particular will the
widow had a power to invade corpus to any extent,50 and (2) cases
seeking to determine whether the power was unlimited so as to create
a fee when joined with a life estate.5 ' While the court admitted that
some of the cases in the second category imposed limitations on an
apparently unlimited power, it was believed that the primary purpose
there was to avoid the much criticized rule, now changed by statute
in Tennessee, 52 that the life beneficiary with an unlimited power
owns a fee simple which descends to his heirs, next of kin, or testamentary beneficiaries, and thus defeats the interests of the takers in
default or remainder beneficiaries named by the donor of the power.
These cases did not impress the court in the instant case as establishing
a general rule that an otherwise unlimited power to invade corpus can
be exercised only to provide support and maintenance.
The constitutional issue seemed more difficult as the court agreed
that at the time the testator executed the will and died, and until the
1951 Act the power would not have been includable in the donee's
estate. "Does inclusion of the stock in her estate under the 1951 Act
result in retroactive and constitutionally impermissible taxation?"
asked the court.5 3 It was agreed that if the donor bad been writing
his will under the 1951 Act, he could have limited his wife's power
of invasion by the ascertainable standard defined in the Code and
thereby retained a non-taxable power. It is certainly the custom of
Congress, although not without exception, to make tax changes prospective only in application, or to provide a reasonable period of time
for taxpayers to adjust their affairs. In the instant case it was argued by
taxpayer's counsel that since the donor-testator had died in 1947
and the beneficiary had enjoyed the trust for four years when the
1951 Act was enacted, it was too late to renounce the unlimited power
49. 38 Tenn. App. 1, 270 S.W.2d 196 (1953).
50. As examples the court cited Williams v. Coldwell, 172 Tenn. 214, 111 S.W.2d
367 (1937); Downing v. Johnson, 45 Tenn. 229 (1867).
51. Redman v. Evans, 184 Tenn. 404, 199 S.W.2d 115 (1947); Mauk v. Irwin, 175
Tenn. 443, 135 S.W.2d 922 (1940); Wailer v. Sproles, 160 Tenn. 11, 22 S.W.2d 4
1929), were cited as examples.
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-106 (1956).
53. 228 F. Supp. at 142.

DECEDENTS' ESTATES

1195

to invade. The court decided that while she had accepted the income
from the trust for four years, she had not exercised the power and
was not precluded from renouncing or disclaiming within a reasonable time after the 1951 Powers Act. The court agreed that this may
have put the beneficiary to a hard choice, but that a hard choice
does not render the imposition of the tax unconstitutional.
At bottom the issue is whether the 1951 Act is indeed being applied
retroactively against the estate of the widow who died in 1958. While
the donor-husband died in 1947 leaving the donee-widow a general
power of appointment which would nevertheless not be taxed in
her estate under the law existing in 1947, the Government will
probably contend that it is applying the 1951 Act prospectively in
1958 to a situation then existing. The answer to the problem would
seem to turn in part on whether the donee-widow could have done
anything after enactment of the 1951 Act by release or otherwise
which would have converted her unlimited general power of appointment into a non-taxable limited power.54
54. The district court decision has now been affirmed in all respects by the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Ewing v. Rountree, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 12,323 (6th
Cir. June 4, 1965) (Phillips, H., J.).

